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The Afghan Local Police (ALP) has its ori-
gins in an international counterinsurgency 
(COIN) programme that sought to raise vil-
lage-level defence forces from within com-
munities that would help expel the Taliban 
from their areas. The programme was meant 
to further the COIN objective of defeating 
insurgents. However, it departed from ‘main-
stream’ COIN in that it is based more on a 
light footprint of international forces who 
would tap into the purported power of ‘tradi-
tional’ systems of local decision-making and 
security provision to tip the balance against 
the insurgency in rural Afghanistan. In this, 
we suggest, the ALP can be understood as 
a COIN security ‘sub’-culture (Kaldor and 
Selchow 2015) that pursues COIN objectives 
by means of different practices intended to 
correct the shortcomings of the overall inter-
national ‘project’ (Suhrke 2011).
In emphasising the purported power of 
supposedly local, traditional or informal 
forms of order, the ALP parallels a broader 
shift in zeitgeist. This shift can be observed 
on two levels. On the policy level, in response 
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to widespread loss of conviction in the power 
of externally engineered ‘state-building’ 
efforts to fix supposedly ‘failed’ states, the 
international development and security pol-
icy discourses increasingly see ‘bottom-up’ as 
a more cost-effective, efficient, appropriate 
and viable alternative to prevailing modali-
ties of intervention. The ALP, for example, 
can be interpreted as a policy that has taken 
to heart exhortations for ‘alternative non-
state-centric approaches to governance, 
the control of violence, peace-building, and 
development’ and to be based on an appre-
ciation of ‘the strengths of the societies in 
question, acknowledging their resilience, 
encouraging indigenous creative responses 
to the problems, and strengthening their 
own capacities for endurance’ (Boege et al 
2009a: 14). Meanwhile, this policy-level 
shift has been paralleled by, but needs to be 
distinguished from, an increasingly promi-
nent and diverse scholarship that seeks to 
overcome the perceived intellectual failures 
of the failed states discourse by redefining 
statehood and suggesting ‘more empirically 
grounded or more conceptually innovative’ 
(Hagmann and Péclard 2010) research into 
the emergence and practice of local govern-
ance and authority in situations of violent 
conflict. While scholarship in this vein is 
opening the way to a much more sophisti-
cated analysis of social phenomena and pro-
cesses currently affecting the lives of billions 
of people across the world, the policy turn to 
the local contains highly problematic impli-
cations that have yet to be fully unpacked or 
sufficiently considered by either the policy or 
the academic communities.
The ALP programme has proven extremely 
problematic in practice. We draw attention 
to the wide diversity and changeability of 
ALP practices and distinguish between their 
contribution to local experiences of secu-
rity and their contribution to international 
counterinsurgency objectives. The bewil-
dering diversity and ambiguity of impacts 
(Noori 2015) is captured by the US military 
Special Operations Forces’ (SOF) expression, 
‘if you’ve seen one village stability platform, 
you’ve seen one village stability platform’ 
(Hanlin 2011; Ives 2013).1 According to one 
assessment: 
[r]oughly one third of ALP units are 
enhancing local security, undermin-
ing insurgent influence, and facilitat-
ing better governance ( . . . ). Another 
one third are not producing such out-
comes and may, in certain respects, be 
engaged in collusion with the enemy 
or in abusive behavior that abets the 
enemy. The last third falls somewhere 
in between the first two groups’ (Joint 
Special Operations University, quoted 
in Smith 2015). 
In addition to great spatial variation, some 
units appear to have been involved in seri-
ous abuses against the populations that they 
supposedly protect, whilst others morphed 
quickly in local perceptions from contribut-
ing to security to driving insecurity (Aikens 
2014; HRW 2011:3; ICG 2015; Mashal 2011). 
In this article we seek to explore why the 
ALP has proven so messy and to explain the 
gap between ALP objectives on paper and 
the way the programme has played out in 
practice. The ALP case indeed suggests that 
policies seeking to reflexively tap the pur-
ported power of the ‘local’ – depicted as 
more culturally appropriate, effective and 
legitimate – do not simply overcome the 
limitations of mainstream forms of inter-
vention, but introduce new complexities 
of their own. Here the distinction becomes 
important between ‘bottom-up’ policy inter-
ventions and the more theoretically-driven 
scholarship that is often perceived to underpin 
and justify such policies. While acknowledg-
ing the difficulties of the ALP in practice, the 
more theoretically-driven work should not 
be dismissed too hastily. Far from justify-
ing the ALP, the emerging literature should 
instead make policymakers cautious about 
the current turn to the local both in wider 
US SOF engagements around the world and 
in the broader international development 
and security policy communities. Moreover, 
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it offers useful ways to interpret the contrast 
between the neat ALP blueprint and the 
practice.
We seek to highlight two strengths of the 
emerging theories. First, the heuristic of 
dynamics of contestation has advantages 
over dominant approaches to the political 
order of spaces where a monopoly of the 
legitimate use of force is not an established 
fact. A second, less well-observed, strength of 
such approaches, is their ability to encom-
pass different forms of international inter-
vention into the frame of study as another 
layer of actors engaged in dynamic contesta-
tion processes. The emerging theoretical work 
therefore provides a useful lens not only for 
understanding the dynamics of conflict-torn 
spaces, but also for understanding the sup-
posedly unexpected consequences of policy 
interventions seeking to tap such dynamics.
To demonstrate these theoretical strengths 
we examine evidence from the District of 
Andar in Ghazni Province and apply the 
heuristic of dynamic contestation to explore 
why an apparently ‘messy’ ALP programme 
played out as it did. In analysing this con-
text, part of our intention is to demonstrate 
the analytic purchase of more dynamic and 
emergent conceptions of authority in places 
where the formal state is at best one among 
many authorities. We also seek to show how 
this heuristic approach can incorporate 
international intervention within the ana-
lytic frame, including interventions like the 
ALP, that seek to reflexively harness insights 
about the strength of local, traditional or 
informal authority to achieve ostensibly 
more legitimate and effective interventions. 
At heart, we argue that the ALP reveals a ten-
sion between ascribing power and agency to 
local dynamics and assuming that local inter-
ests can be harnessed and aligned to external 
objectives. The messy, spatially varied and 
mercurial character of the programme in 
practice reflects that it added to, but did not 
overwrite, existing local dynamics of contes-
tation between an array of actors. When the 
ALP was introduced into Andar’s complex 
local landscape, it became a resource which 
a wide array of local actors mobilised to 
influence according to their own perceived 
interests. The US forces sent to establish ALP 
units saw the programme in terms of the 
COIN objective of encouraging local actors 
to align behind a shared practice of resisting 
insurgents. The ‘security gap’ between COIN 
objectives, pursued through the ALP modal-
ity, and the ‘messiness’ of the ALP in prac-
tice, is therefore better understood not in 
terms of stated international counterinsur-
gency objectives but as the contingent out-
come of multiple ‘power poles’ (Bierschenk 
and Olivier de Sardan 1997: 441, quoted in 
Hagmann and Péclard 2010: 542) vying to 
make the programme serve their own inter-
ests. Moreover, the reasons for the problems 
encountered can actually be well understood 
and even anticipated by taking seriously the 
more theoretically-driven literature from 
which the ALP and other ‘bottom-up’ policy 
interventions supposedly draw inspiration.
The article is arranged as follows. First, we 
present the ALP as depicted ‘on paper’ as a 
contemporary programme that, while rooted 
in COIN doctrine and objectives, emphasises 
the importance of ‘local’ tradition and cus-
tom. We then locate the programme within 
a wider turn in zeitgeist entailing grow-
ing interest in spontaneous and evolving 
forms of authority emerging in situations 
of violent conflict and attenuation of formal 
state authority. Thirdly, we explore the case 
of the ALP in Andar by contrasting official 
depictions of the programme with the way 
it has played out ‘in practice’. The case illus-
trates both the complexities and difficulties 
involved with policies of ‘going local’ and 
the value of emerging heuristic approaches 
that jettison state centric analytic lenses in 
favour of emphasis on dynamic contestation 
processes.
The ALP on Paper: Empowering the 
Local
The ALP is a US-sponsored, NATO-backed 
security programme that trains ‘local 
Afghans in rural areas to defend their com-
munities against threats from insurgents 
Vincent et al: The Afghan Local Police – Closing the Security Gap?Art. 45, page 4 of 26
and other illegally-armed groups’ (DOD 
2011: 68). It was inaugurated in 2010 as part 
of the US-led ‘surge’ effort, at a time when 
tens of thousands of additional troops were 
deployed on top of the existing international 
military forces that were attempting to turn 
the tide against mounting insurgency. Given 
Afghanistan’s size and its varied and often 
daunting terrain, even the combined Afghan 
National Security Forces (ANSF) and inter-
national military presence were insufficient 
to extend security to the local level or to 
dominate the countryside – much of which 
remained contested space. International 
forces came to see villages as caught in the 
middle, threatened by international and 
national forces for cooperating with insur-
gents and menaced by the insurgents if they 
did not.
The ALP, as presented in official documents, 
was intended to help address these difficul-
ties. Lacking sufficient forces to pervasively 
dominate the countryside at the district and 
sub-district level, the programme envisaged 
enlisting villagers themselves against the 
insurgency, ‘targeting’, according to NATO, 
‘rural areas with limited to no ANSF pres-
ence . . . to enable conditions for improved 
security, governance and development’ 
(NATO 2012). By providing villagers with 
the means to provide ‘security’ themselves, 
the programme was intended to change the 
basic equation confronting villagers. In this, 
the programme’s basis in US COIN doctrine 
was apparent. COIN holds that insurgency 
cannot be defeated by military force alone 
but is achieved politically when the popu-
lation is persuaded to consent ‘to the gov-
ernment’s legitimacy and stops actively and 
passively supporting the insurgency’ (US 
Army 2006: 1–14). COIN forces seek local 
opposition to insurgents, and ways to enable 
that opposition, while trying to generate a 
tipping point in which momentum swings 
decisively away from the insurgency (Jones 
and Muñoz 2010: 74). The ALP should be 
understood as designed to enable villagers 
wanting to ‘stand up for themselves’, and the 
programme grew from the realization that 
some villages across Afghanistan seemed 
to be spontaneously resisting insurgent 
groups (Catanzaro and Windmueller 2011). 
Signalling that the programme intends to 
respond to spontaneous bottom-up resent-
ment rather than being imposed on villages, 
villagers must ‘have either demonstrated 
active resistance to the insurgency, or have 
recently asked for assistance to do so’ to be 
eligible (Stevens 2011: 65).
ALP advocates portray village-level self-
defence forces as ‘traditional’ – and hence 
legitimate and efficient (Jones and Munoz 
2010; Rector 2012). Indeed, in many parts 
of Afghanistan community level secu-
rity arrangements existed for generations 
(Karokhail and Schmeidl 2006; Schmeidl 
and Karokhail 2009a). The traditional secu-
rity mechanisms of the Pashtun provinces 
in southern and eastern Afghanistan, called 
‘Arbakai’ in Pashto (‘Salwishti’ or ‘Shalgoon’ 
in FATA, and ‘Paltanai’ in Kandahar) (Tariq 
2008: 3), for example, were volunteer ini-
tiatives for enforcing law and order and pro-
viding community security (Schmeidl and 
Karokhail 2009a; Tariq 2009). Arbakai have 
received particular attention from inter-
national forces, who often ‘use the term to 
depict well-meaning, disciplined, traditional 
community defence forces, obedient only to 
the tribal assembly (jirga)’ (Lefèvre 2010: 3). 
Building on this tradition the ALP design, 
as presented in official public documents, 
entails Afghan and international forces 
working with village shuras (councils) to 
agree to the establishment of a local ALP 
unit, thereby ensuring local ownership, 
legitimacy and accountability. The shura 
then nominates adult men from within 
the community as recruits. Before enrol-
ment, nominees were to be vetted both by 
the Afghan Government and international 
forces. If accepted, recruits were then sup-
posed to be equipped and given three weeks 
of training with US SOF (DOD 2011: 68–70; 
DOD 2012). ALP units (officially consisting of 
around 30 patrolmen) were supposed to be 
raised solely through SOF units, embedded 
in villages as part of wider ‘Village Stability 
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Operations’ who, augmented by a variety 
of other initiatives, were to pursue an ‘inte-
grated approach to governance, security, and 
development’ (DOD 2011: 68; Felbab-Brown 
2013; Robinson 2013; Saum-Manning 2012: 
8; Huslander and Spivey 2012).
On paper at least, the ALP are not ‘police’, 
having no powers to arrest, and are only 
empowered to investigate crimes if spe-
cifically requested by the Afghan National 
Police (ANP). Rather, they are intended as a 
lightly armed, defensive, pro-government 
presence at the village level capable of deter-
ring insurgents – a ‘night watch with AK-47s’ 
(Radin 2011), that can call upon ANSF and 
international forces for support. While the 
US provided funding, training, equipment 
and technical assistance, this was directed 
through the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) 
in which the initiative is formally housed. 
By making ALP units formally accountable 
to the District Police Chief, complement-
ing local decision-making with national 
and international vetting processes, and 
SOF training and mentorship, the ALP was 
presented as creating a fairly reliable, 
limited, pro-government presence with 
which the ANSF and international forces 
could work.
The programme became a critical com-
ponent of the overall international military 
strategy during the surge period. General 
Petraeus, credited with the apparent suc-
cesses of the ‘Sons of Iraq’ programme, saw 
the ALP as the ‘game changer’ in Afghanistan, 
and having made winning Karzai’s approval 
for the plan a ‘top initial goal’, invested 
considerable time lobbying the President 
(DeYoung and Chandrasekaran 2010; Rubin 
2010). The ALP was,  in Petraeus’ view, ‘argu-
ably the most critical element in our effort 
to help Afghanistan develop the capacity to 
secure itself’ (Norris 2013);  it was seen as an 
initiative capable of turning the tide against 
the insurgency, ending the drawn-out con-
frontation with the insurgency, and mak-
ing possible the exit of international forces 
without risking the collapse of the Afghan 
government.
Following its inauguration in 2010 the ALP 
grew quickly. Initially slated as a temporary 
(2–5 years) force that would peak at 10,000 
men, in mid-2011 it was announced that it 
would be tripled to 30,000. In 2013 it was 
announced that it would expand to 45,000 
with funding guaranteed by the Pentagon 
until at least 2018 (Pessin 2010; Goodhand 
and Hakimi 2014: 14–15, quoting US Special 
Operations Command figures). The US envis-
aged that 30,000 ALP personnel in 154 dis-
tricts by the end of December 2014 would 
be assigned to 1,320 checkpoints across 29 
of the 34 provinces of Afghanistan (SIGAR 
2014). By December 1, 2014, there were 
27,837 ALP personnel (SIGAR 2015: 99). 
In part this expansion can be interpreted 
as a measure to fill a gap in capacity as 
international forces drew down but before 
ANSF reached full strength (Chayes 2011). 
Although the programme is small relative 
to total ANSF (with over 350,000 person-
nel as of January 2014) the distribution of 
the ALP across ‘key’ rural locations, where 
government and international presence has 
remained tenuous and challenged by the 
insurgency, may endow it with disproportion-
ate significance. Additionally, if what some of 
its proponents have said about the power of 
the specific programme design proves correct, 
its relatively small size may belie its signifi-
cance to future security in Afghanistan.
Following the security transition pro-
cess and the arrival of the national unity 
government of President Ghani and ‘CEO’ 
Abdullah after the protracted 2014 presiden-
tial elections, the Afghan government ‘has 
not determined the final disposition of the 
ALP’ (SIGAR 2015: 99). As of January 2015 
it was unclear whether the US Department 
of Defense (DOD) still envisaged funding 
the programme to 2018 (SIGAR 2015: 99), 
although the Ghani administration may be 
‘seeking money to continue the program’ 
beyond that time (ICG 2015:i). Whether 
or not the programme is continued, it has 
trained and armed some 28,000 people 
in villages of tenuous government reach. 
The ALP (and broader VSO), moreover, may 
Vincent et al: The Afghan Local Police – Closing the Security Gap?Art. 45, page 6 of 26
well prove to have significance beyond 
Afghanistan. Reflecting on the VSO/ALP 
concept, Robinson argues that ‘[u]ltimately, 
success really involves applying this model 
elsewhere’ and notes that ‘[t]his is the 
vision Admiral McRaven [the then-outgo-
ing Commander of US Special Operations 
Command] is driving toward’ (Manea 2014). 
US Special Forces now contemplate their 
possible role in future operations around the 
world, in areas besides the pursuit of terror-
ists (Robinson 2013). US policymakers seem 
(for now) reluctant to engage in the pro-
longed and involved forms of intervention 
that evolved in Afghanistan. The possibility 
of distributed SOF teams raising indigenous 
forces that address US objectives, without 
large-scale deployments, and in ways per-
ceived as less likely to degenerate into ‘mili-
tia’, appears to be under active consideration 
as a policy option.
The ALP in Context: A Changing 
Zeitgeist
While official depictions of the ALP pro-
gramme clearly suggest its basis in counter-
insurgency, other aspects of the programme 
suggest that it is better located at the conflu-
ence between COIN doctrine and a wider con-
temporary shift in zeitgeist regarding how 
best to conceptualise, and most effectively 
intervene in conflict-torn spaces. In describ-
ing this turn, we emphasise a distinction 
between two related efforts. The first involves 
theoretically-driven work motivated by the 
desire to overcome the perceived limitations 
of dominant approaches to understanding 
such settings. The second is more oriented 
to designing and advocating policy interven-
tions that respond to the perceived prob-
lems associated with existing approaches. 
The conceptual distinction between these 
different projects is less clear-cut in practice 
since several authors, implicitly or explicitly, 
seek to address both questions. However, we 
highlight the distinction to draw attention to 
what is involved in moving between seeking 
to better understand social phenomena and 
attempting to intervene to achieve particu-
lar, typically externally derived, objectives. 
We present this turn in more detail in three 
steps. First, we set out the neo-Weberian terms 
in which the dominant theoretical and policy 
discourses were framed, and how perceived 
shortcomings of mainstream policies created 
a policy appetite for alternative approaches. 
In its emphasis on tapping the purported 
power of traditional forms of authority, the 
ALP programme clearly embodies the wider 
policy turn in international development 
and security circles towards overcoming 
the limits of the dominant ‘top down’ state-
building model by devising interventions 
that work ‘with the grain’ of existing local 
governance (Kelsall 2008). Second, although 
justifications of the ALP superficially appear 
to be close cousins of many of the arguments 
being developed by scholars more oriented 
to theoretical challenges of conflict-torn 
spaces, this impression is misleading. Taking 
seriously the more theoretically driven lit-
erature should make us cautious of policies 
seeking to reflexively harness local dynamics 
in pursuit of international objectives. Third, 
as we seek to demonstrate through our dis-
cussion of Andar District, the emerging theo-
retical work provides a useful lens not only 
for understanding dynamics of conflict-torn 
spaces, but also for understanding the sup-
posedly unexpected consequences of policy 
interventions seeking to tap such dynamics. 
Our point of departure is the observa-
tion that previously dominant approaches 
to understanding the political order of 
conflict-torn spaces in ‘neo-Weberian’ terms 
have recently been rivalled by increasing 
interest in alternative forms of analysis.2 
Neo-Weberian understandings of statehood 
derive from the Weberian ideal-typical 
bureaucratic-rational state seen, at root, as 
a monopoliser of the legitimate means of 
coercion. Although Weber intended his ideal 
types as ‘pure’ logical categories for analyti-
cal purposes that had ‘no connection with 
value judgments’ (Weber 2011 [1904]: 98; 
emphasis in the original), his formulation 
has in recent decades become a normative-
teleological benchmark dominating both the 
scholarly and policy discourses  (Migdal and 
Schlichte 2005; Hagmann and Péclard 2010; 
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Weigand 2015). The view that deviation from 
this condition is a dangerous pathology 
threatening the wider community of states 
has underpinned the tendency to categorise 
states with a low degree of monopolisation 
of force as ‘fragile’ or even ‘failed’ (Fukuyama 
2004; Rotberg 2004). As the problems beset-
ting such places came to be defined in terms 
of state failure, so the view emerged that 
the solution lay in concerted international 
efforts to establish supposedly Weberian 
ideal-typical state structures. This state-build-
ing agenda is widely seen as the lodestar that 
guided a range of international interventions 
since the end of the Cold War, including that 
in Afghanistan. Yet after a period in which 
international actors grew increasingly ambi-
tious, attempting the wholesale external 
engineering and transformative ‘modernisa-
tion’ of post-conflict countries, the visceral 
difficulties encountered in Afghanistan rein-
forced a sense of deepening doubt about the 
feasibility of such international endeavours 
(Suhrke 2007).
The apparent ‘poor performance and 
high cost of statebuilding’ (Meagher 2012; 
Paris and Sisk 2009) provoked a search for 
explanations as well as a new receptiveness 
at the policy level to alternative or comple-
mentary approaches. A view emerged that 
the travails of state-building were rooted in 
the gulf between externally derived under-
standings and objectives and local realities 
and demands. State-building stood accused 
of being overly ‘top down’, both in the sense 
of being derived from international pre-
scriptions and in being disproportionately 
focused on central organs of state that would 
project government across the territory. 
Intervenors in Afghanistan, for example, 
were accused of assuming that strength-
ening the centre would have a ‘cascading’ 
effect in which ‘the rest of the country would 
become successively subject to the Afghan 
state’ (Schetter 2013: 8). Such interventions 
were thought to lack traction because they 
either largely ignored the periphery, assumed 
a tabula rasa on which they could build 
afresh (Ucko 2013: 529) or, influenced by the 
‘pathologizing’ failed states and ungoverned 
spaces discourses (Bell 2012; Hughes and 
Pupavac 2005), treated areas beyond state 
control as sites of breakdown or Hobbesian 
anarchy (Call 2010; Hagmann and Hoehne 
2009; Hagmann and Péclard 2010). A sense 
emerged that an external vision of govern-
ment could not simply be imposed upon a 
given country and that such efforts could 
and would be locally resisted or co-opted 
(Englebert and Tull 2008).
Meanwhile, more theoretically-oriented 
scholarship had been expressing dissatisfac-
tion with the intellectual blind-spots created 
by prevailing neo-Weberian state centrism, 
which caricatured areas where effective con-
trol of the de jure state was limited or con-
tested as sites of failure and chaos (Hill 2005: 
148, cited in Hagmann and Péclard 2010: 
541). Consequently, they were incapable of 
seeing them for what they were and inatten-
tive to the insight that ‘absence of the state 
does not mean a void in its place’ (Bierschenk 
and Olivier de Sardan 1997: 441). Scholarship 
emerged decrying the ‘failures of the state 
failure debate’ (Hagmann and Hoehne 2009), 
seeking to reconceptualise and empirically 
document the ways social life continues to 
be ordered and reordered where state con-
trol is limited or contested (eg Hagmann and 
Péclard (ed) 2011; Menkhaus 2006/7; Migdal 
and Schlichte (ed) 2005; Raeymaekers et 
al 2008; Schetter (ed) 2013; Vlassenroot 
and Raeymaekers 2004; Doornbos 2010; 
Friedrichs 2010; Weigand 2015; Schlichte 
and Wilke 2000). In the process, researchers 
sought new ways to describe and conceptual-
ise the phenomena they encountered, avoid-
ing dependence on prevailing ‘essentialist, 
teleological and instrumentalist conceptions’ 
of the state leaving ‘little room for alterna-
tive models’ (Hagmann and Hoehne 2009) 
and documenting the roles played by a range 
of ‘non-state’ actors in governance processes. 
Migdal and Schlichte (2005), for example, 
presented a dynamic understanding of polit-
ical order and statehood that redirects the 
analytical focus from the degree of monopo-
lisation of force to interactions between the 
involved actors or authorities. Hagmann and 
Péclard (2010) use this definition to develop 
Vincent et al: The Afghan Local Police – Closing the Security Gap?Art. 45, page 8 of 26
their heuristic framework of ‘negotiating 
statehood’, describing ‘processes of state 
(de-)construction’ (ibid.: 544) as a non-linear 
and at least partly undetermined product of 
ongoing, dynamic interactions between dif-
ferently situated actors (ibid: 545; Doornbos 
2010: 752). Their emphasis upon processes 
of ‘negotiation, contestation and brico-
lage’ echoes the language of a number of 
scholars similarly interested in understand-
ing and documenting processes through 
which ‘governance’ is produced in contexts 
of apparently limited government (in the 
neo-Weberian sense) (eg Lund (ed 2007); 
Menkhaus 2006/7; Mielke et al 2011). 
We emphasise two analytic benefits 
of drawing upon the kinds of heuristic 
approach being developed in this research 
tradition. First, the notion that social order 
‘never ceases to exist but rather changes its 
institutional and normative contents’ (Wilde 
and Mielke 2013: 353) draws attention to the 
ways new governance arrangements, how-
ever provisional, emerge as people negoti-
ate confusing post-conflict settings in which 
questions of political order remain at least 
partly unsettled. A second benefit, which has 
received less attention, however, is that such 
approaches are capable of bringing interna-
tional intervenors into the frame of study 
as additional sets of ‘stakeholders’ vying to 
influence the emerging political order. The 
‘failed states’ discourse framed such settings 
more in terms of threats posed to neigh-
bouring states and the wider state system 
but tended to neglect or caricature local set-
tings. Consequently, while the failed states 
discourse served as a justificatory basis for 
intervention it was less well-equipped either 
to anticipate how particular forms of inter-
national engagement would be received, or 
how they would ‘play’ into fluid and con-
tested local dynamics.
Where much of this work focused on 
the theoretical and empirical exposition of 
social and political life under such condi-
tions, many working in this vein have also 
considered the policy implications aris-
ing from their ideas. An influential body of 
work developed by Boege et al., for example, 
advocates ‘re-conceptualising fragile states 
as hybrid political orders’ (2008: 15) that 
combine ‘state institutions, customary insti-
tutions and new elements of citizenship 
and civil society in networks of governance 
which are not introduced from the outside, 
but embedded in the societal structures on 
the ground’ (ibid.: 17). They express the hope 
that their ideas could ‘contribute to a reorien-
tation of external assistance’, so that ‘possi-
bilities of externally influencing governance 
structures can be re-examined, shifting the 
focus from narrow models of state-building 
to understanding and engaging with hybrid 
institutions’ (ibid). Kaplan, similarly, argues 
that rather than ’trying to foist a Western 
style top-down state structure on Somalia’s 
deeply decentralized and fluid society, the 
international community needs to work with 
the country’s long-standing traditional insti-
tutions to build a government from the bot-
tom up. Such an approach, he adds, ‘might 
prove to be not only Somalia’s salvation but 
also a blueprint for rescuing other similarly 
splintered states’ (Kaplan 2010: 81).
The parallels between the broad policy turn 
described above and the ALP programme 
are difficult to ignore.3 The programme was 
developed against a backdrop of mounting 
insurgency, deteriorating relations between 
the Afghan government and its interna-
tional partners, and deepening doubt about 
the feasibility of the international ‘project’ 
in Afghanistan (Suhrke 2011). The ALP was 
explicitly developed from a critique that ech-
oed wider trends in locating the shortcom-
ings of the Afghanistan intervention in an 
unhealthy fixation on neo-Weberian state-
building and neglect and ignorance of local 
politics. One ALP advocate argued that since 
2001, international policy had been based 
on ‘a fatally flawed assumption: The recipe 
for stability is building a strong central gov-
ernment capable of establishing law and 
order in rural areas’ (Jones 2009a; Jones and 
Muñoz 2010: 6–7). That assumption, rooted 
in the reconstruction and state-building tem-
plate of the 1990s and 2000s, was contrasted 
with a portrayal of Afghan history as a series 
of top-down, centralizing attempts to project 
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a (neo-Weberian) monopoly of force across 
the territory, typically provoking the rural, 
traditional and conservative majority of the 
population into ‘social and political revolts’ 
(Jones 2009a). Exemplified mainly by the 
failed efforts of Amanullah Khan between 
1919–1929 (Jones 2009a; Jones 2009b; Jones 
2010; Jones 2012: 21), similar claims are fre-
quently made about the pro-Soviet Khalqi 
regime’s ‘all-out assault on rural conserva-
tism’ in 1978–79, which sparked rounds of 
violence in Afghanistan that have yet to be 
concluded (Giustozzi and Ibrahimi 2012: 1). 
This influential account of Afghan history 
argues not only that much of Afghanistan 
existed beyond effective state authority, but 
that the very effort to exert such control had 
driven repeated cycles of violence (Jones and 
Muñoz 2010: 84). In this context, the con-
temporary insurgency began to look like the 
latest rural, conservative, traditionalist back-
lash against externally-driven centralising 
and modernising projects. To these critics, 
the idea that central state authority could 
be built and then projected into the Afghan 
countryside revealed the collective failure of 
the international community, academics and 
western-educated Afghan government tech-
nocrats to ‘grasp the local nature of Afghan 
politics’ (Jones 2009a; Jones and Muñoz 
2010: 6–7). From this perspective, the empir-
ically oriented and conceptually innovative 
scholarly work being developed in parts of 
the academy suddenly seemed exactly what 
US military planners wanted in order to 
understand and effectively engage the deci-
sive authority structures in Afghanistan.
Reflecting the rising policy interest in 
alternative modes of intervention that work 
through existing authorities at the local level, 
the ALP programme asserted that the ‘key’ 
to stability in rural Afghanistan lay in the 
approach taken by the Musahiban dynasty 
(spanning the rule of Zahir Shah, Nadir 
Shah and Daoud Khan from 1929–1978). 
The Musahibans were portrayed as having 
recognised the futility of seeking to forcibly 
project their state into rural areas. Instead 
they viewed statecraft as the work of engag-
ing with customary, tribal and other forms of 
governance and security provision beyond 
the state while managing local security ‘under 
the auspices of legitimate tribal institutions’ 
(Jones 2009). While such an approach might 
appear at odds with the mental template of 
an ideal-typical Weberian state, this concep-
tion of statecraft as encompassing diverse 
repertoires for negotiating relations with a 
range of non-state actors aligns closely with 
historical accounts of state formation pro-
cesses in early modern Europe. As Goodhand 
and Hakimi (2014: 8) point out, ‘states and 
imperial powers have frequently acted as 
brokers rather than monopolists, seeking 
to extend their control through franchising 
the means of coercion’.4 This account of the 
Musahiban ‘secret’ to state-building, more-
over, would not seem out of place among 
contemporary portrayals of ‘hybrid political 
orders’ or ‘mediated states’.
The view that a strategy of harnessing 
local institutions was superior to top-down 
imposition was used to argue that existing 
efforts should, at least, be complemented 
by strategies for understanding and working 
through existing local political and security 
institutions. In this the ALP paralleled the 
suggestion, made in relation to Somalia, that 
the ‘best hope for state revival may lie in the 
explicit pursuit of a mediated state – in which 
a central government with limited power 
and capacity relies on a diverse range of 
local authorities to execute core functions of 
government and mediate relations between 
local communities and the state’ (Menkhaus 
2007: 103). Politics in Afghanistan were 
‘local’, but having fixated on central state 
institutions, the international community 
had largely neglected the countryside and the 
villages. While the international community 
was ‘looking in the wrong place’ – focusing 
on national government institutions (Jones 
2009a) – the Taliban had implemented a 
skilful bottom-up strategy aimed at persuad-
ing, co-opting or coercing local leaders, par-
ticularly of majority communities that under 
Karzai found themselves ‘marginalized by 
ruling minority tribes’ (Jones 2010: 334).
Given the extent to which local poli-
tics in Afghanistan remained opaque to 
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interveners, the discovery of the importance 
of local and rural dynamics by international 
military actors was welcomed (Ucko 2013). 
Three issues with the historical account used 
to frame the ALP programme stand out, 
however. First, as Giustozzi has observed, the 
‘successful’ Musahiban state-building strat-
egy of achieving progressive rural domina-
tion through intermediaries and co-optation 
was an ‘imperial’ model of governance that 
worked not on the basis of impartial admin-
istration ‘but on certain communities ruling 
over others or on a strategy of divide and 
rule among local leaders’ (Giustozzi 2009: 
71; Karokhail and Schmeidl 2006). From 
this perspective, the strategies of ‘successful’ 
periods were implicated in producing a ‘pre-
carious’, crisis-prone and inherently unsta-
ble system. The local security mechanisms 
attributed to the Musahiban period had not 
existed in seclusion from the state but had 
been sites of negotiation and contestation as 
the government sought to increase its grip 
upon the periphery. Local institutions were 
profoundly (and differentially) affected by 
such processes – local security institutions, 
for example, varied considerably in terms 
of relations between local mechanisms and 
national security forces (Tariq 2008). State 
agents seeking to influence or instrumen-
talise local institutions, meanwhile, required 
high levels of understanding and skill. This 
suggests that contemporary efforts to ‘go 
local’ may risk generating similarly precari-
ous dynamics, especially given the limited 
local level understanding possessed by out-
side interveners.
Secondly, the literature indicates that in 
the past Arbakai and similar institutions 
were embedded in a wider cultural frame-
work, having been raised and controlled 
through customary councils that enjoyed sig-
nificant local legitimacy. However, more than 
thirty years of continuous violent conflict in 
Afghanistan has, in addition to destroying 
physical infrastructure and state institutions, 
also had profoundly destructive and trans-
formative effects on village level social struc-
tures (Noelle-Karimi 2006; Noelle-Karimi 
2013). These dynamics empowered new 
classes of actors and drove local responses to 
insecurity that contributed to producing new 
forms of order and authority (Giustozzi and 
Ullah 2006). This compounds the difficulty 
in identifying what is ‘traditional’ or equating 
what is ‘local’ with legitimacy (Schmeidl 2009).
Thirdly, it is not obvious that insurgency 
in Afghanistan is best understood as a rural 
rebellion against a state-building effort in the 
tradition of earlier delusional visions of mod-
ernising grandeur. Portraying the insurgency 
as a rural mass rejection of state-building or 
modernisation efforts obscures that the day-
to-day experience of many rural Afghans was 
not best described as an encounter with the 
grand, internationally-backed Afghan gov-
ernment-led, state-building and modernisa-
tion mission that was deemed to have failed 
or to have fuelled insurgency (Schmeidl and 
Karokhail 2009b). Particularly in the south 
and southeast, post-2001 rural experience 
was not primarily of an ambitious neo-
Weberian state-building experiment, but of 
a heavily militarised international presence 
prosecuting a war on terror and empowering 
a government characterised by a combina-
tion of corruption, predation and ineptitude 
(Fishstein and Wilder 2012; Rangelov and 
Theros 2012).
The ALP in Practice: Impressions 
from Ghazni Province
In this section, we consider the evidence 
from Andar District of Ghazni Province, 
supplementing the available literature with 
interviews with local people. In order to 
investigate how the ALP programme works 
in a specific context, we conducted three 
rounds (spring 2013, 2014 and 2015) of 
phone interviews with a small number of 
selected community elders in the district. 
The case underscores the gap between por-
trayals of the programme ‘on paper’ and the 
way the programme has played out in prac-
tice. It also reinforces the sense, emerging 
from the body of existing literature, that the 
ALP is highly ambiguous in terms of its con-
tribution to security/insecurity at the local 
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level and in terms of a confusing patchwork 
of wildly divergent outcomes not only from 
village to village, but with ALP units mor-
phing rapidly from apparently locally sup-
ported security provider to predatory actor. 
In exploring the Andar case, we highlight 
some of the problems implied by interna-
tional attempts to modify or invent local gov-
ernance and security institutions by invoking 
tradition, history and culture to advance their 
objectives. Such approaches, we suggest, do 
not simply overcome the problems associ-
ated with ‘top down’ forms of intervention, 
but introduces tensions of its own. However, 
we also seek to demonstrate the analytic 
value of dynamic approaches to political 
order in conflict-torn settings by using such 
an heuristic to interpret what initially appear 
to be messy and unpredictable outcomes. 
Such approaches, we suggest, are capable of 
encompassing both local setting and forms 
of international intervention – even inter-
ventions seeking to reflexively harness the 
‘local’ or ‘traditional’. At heart, we argue, the 
ALP reveals the tension in ascribing power 
and agency to local dynamics while continu-
ing to assume that local interests can be har-
nessed and aligned to external objectives. 
Several provincial and district-level stud-
ies explore the ALP in some depth (eg on 
Baghlan (HRW 2011; Goodhand and Hakimi 
2014), Helmand (Stevens 2011), Herat (HRW 
2011), Kandahar (ICG 2015), Kunduz (HRW 
2011; Goodhand and Hakimi 2014; ICG 2015), 
and Wardak (Goodhand and Hakimi 2014)). 
These studies both underline the complexity 
of local circumstances into which particular 
ALP programmes have been inserted and 
create a chaotic impression of ‘highly une-
ven’ outcomes (Felbab-Brown 2013: 138). In 
some times and places the programme has 
appeared to deliver intended outcomes both 
in furthering anti-Taliban counterinsurgency 
objectives as well as in generating local per-
ceptions that the ALP was making people 
safer. However, most observers provide evi-
dence that in a significant number of cases – 
despite the claim that the programme had 
learned the lessons of its predecessors, and 
the emphasis on local accountability mecha-
nisms in the programme design – ALP units 
have committed serious abuses against the 
population they supposedly protect, thereby 
deepening, rather than alleviating, insecurity 
(Aikins 2014; HRW 2011: 3; ICG 2015; Mashal 
2011; Sarfraz and Norland 2012; Yoshikawa 
and Pennington 2011; Yousafzai and Moreau 
2013). An unpublished US SOF study report-
edly found ‘every fifth ALP is involved in the 
drug trade, extorting illegal taxes, land grab-
bing, murder, rape, running secret deten-
tion facilities and violent internal power 
struggles’ (Ruttig 2013: 5). As with similar 
past efforts, there has been concern that 
this latest internationally-sponsored armed 
actor may one day ‘go rogue’ (Goodhand 
and Hakimi 2014: 45), turning to banditry, 
being co-opted into militias or joining the 
insurgency and violently opposing the state 
(Borger 2012). There is some suggestion that 
this may be already underway. As the interna-
tional presence in Afghanistan has receded, 
so has oversight of ALP units by their US SOF 
mentors, leaving some local residents ‘shiver-
ing with fear’ not at the Taliban but at the 
local ALP military entrepreneurs (Goldstein 
2015; Stancati 2014). The reports of abuses 
that have dogged the ALP have also fed a 
nagging sense of unease that rather than the 
ALP helping villagers to resist the Taliban, 
villagers may actually be reaching out to the 
insurgency for protection from the ALP. Such 
a trend would indicate that besides often cre-
ating insecurity for local communities, the 
ALP can actually fuel the insurgency it was 
set up to defeat.
Competing Authorities in the Andar 
Uprising
The establishment of the ALP in Andar 
District of Ghazni Province is particularly 
interesting because of an apparently spon-
taneous popular uprising against the Taliban 
that broke out in spring 2012, generating 
widespread interest in Afghan and interna-
tional media (Peter 2012; Moreau 2012). US 
Special Operations Command, perhaps read-
ing events through the lens of COIN doctrine 
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as evidence of the population breaking from 
the insurgency, became ‘seized’ with the 
uprising, seeing it as a ‘springboard’ for intro-
ducing the ALP (Robinson 2013: 203; Lubold 
2012; Trofimov 2013). Subsequent efforts 
to replicate and spread the ‘Andar model’ 
underline the importance of this particu-
lar case in wider contemporary US military 
thinking on Afghanistan. 
The dominant narrative about events in 
Andar holds that, having steadily strength-
ened their position (Chivers 2011; Harpviken 
2012; Reuter and Younus 2009), the Taliban 
introduced a number of unpopular meas-
ures in Ghazni, culminating in the closing 
of schools in response to government efforts 
to ban motorcycles, which they relied upon 
(Foschini 2012; Habib 2012a). In this read-
ing, the ban on schooling caused such strong 
local resentment that villagers spontane-
ously rose up and began to forcibly expel 
the Taliban from their villages. This account 
is largely followed by Robinson (2013), who 
reflects the US SOF perspective, and receives 
at least qualified support from contemporary 
media (Farmer 2012; Peter 2012). In an inter-
view, a former mujahidin member and cur-
rent community elder in the district offered 
a similar interpretation of the origins of the 
uprising. He pointed out that international 
and Afghan forces had regularly conducted 
military operations designed to drive out the 
Taliban, but that after military operations 
finished and forces withdrew, the insur-
gents immediately returned and resumed 
harassing and even executing local people. 
According to this interviewee, ‘The Uprising’ 
(‘Paatsoon’) was a locally developed initiative 
that reflected resentment of Taliban behav-
iour. However, the interviewee also stressed 
the failure of the government to retain 
control over the area following anti-Taliban 
clearing operations. The way our interlocutor 
framed his response in terms of government 
shortcomings and how he saw the uprising 
as an attempt to expel the Taliban and pro-
vide local security directly, offers an impor-
tant clue. Many involved in the uprising were 
rejecting the Taliban without welcoming the 
government, and did not see their movement 
as a bridgehead for government control, as it 
was interpreted by outsiders (Foschini 2012; 
Moreau 2012). This middle position, neither 
Taliban nor government, however, would 
prove difficult to maintain.
While compelling, the emerging interna-
tional narrative of a purely ‘popular’ upris-
ing concealed how people in Andar, and 
even different actors involved in the upris-
ing, were using widely differing narratives 
to explain the situation. Moreover, each 
of these narratives, including that emerg-
ing in international coverage, was politi-
cally charged; the language of ‘uprising’ 
can be viewed as a kind of ‘symbolic reper-
toire’ through which different actors seek to 
‘defend and to challenge . . . power relations’ 
(Hagmann and Péclard 2010: 547). Foschini 
and Habib (a pseudonym) provide evidence 
that the uprising was not simply driven by 
popular resentment, but was marked from 
the outset by competition between local 
power-brokers with roots in the anti-Soviet 
jihad, each seeking to mold the uprising to 
serve their own objectives (Foschini 2012; 
Habib 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2013a, 2013b). 
Most accounts acknowledge the role of 
figures affiliated with Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i 
Islami, a mujahedin-era faction that remains 
influential in post-Taliban Afghanistan. 
After the Taliban resurgence in Andar from 
around 2003 (Reuter and Younus 2009), 
descendants of mujahedin era ‘Hizbis’ were 
incorporated into the Taliban movement 
but held significantly different views from 
their comrades on questions such as educa-
tion and development work (Habib 2012a). 
Robinson, perhaps reflecting the US SOF 
narrative, maintains that there was a spon-
taneous uprising but suggests that when its 
leader was killed, a Hizbi ‘political figure’ 
then ‘insinuated himself to assert leader-
ship’ (2013: 204). Foschini (2012) similarly 
believes that the uprising was driven by 
‘a broader and deeper malaise’ conceding 
only that ‘[t]he Hezb-e Islami connection 
has certainly contributed to strengthen and 
militarise the revolt’. On the basis of detailed 
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interviews with local informants, however, 
Habib relates alternative local narratives 
portraying ‘the “uprising” as a revolt by the 
“Hezb Taleban” group against their Taleban 
brothers’ (Habib 2012a) – a view that is 
supported by the way the revolt apparently 
began in a series of historically Hizbi villages 
south of the district centre. An alternative 
account, which also interprets the uprising 
as a Taliban rift, plays down the Hizbi doctri-
nal schism theory, instead emphasising local 
dissatisfaction at growing Pakistani influence 
in the local Taliban movement (Economist 
2012; Felbab-Brown 2013: 149; Rubin and 
Rosenberg 2012).
An additional narrative, corroborated by a 
range of sources, emphasizes the role played 
by Assadullah Khaled, a Karzai-affiliated 
figure who would soon head the Afghan 
National Directorate of Security (NDS). 
Depicted by Habib as ‘probably the single 
most powerful figure in Ghazni calling the 
shots from behind the scenes’ (Habib 2012a), 
Khaled is alleged to have reached out to three 
rival local power-brokers with mujahedin-era 
roots, seeking to influence the uprising and 
realign it as an anti-Taliban and pro-govern-
ment movement. In return for mobilizing 
pro-government arbakai, ‘each would be able 
to hire his men for it, thereby gaining power 
in the area again’ (Habib 2012a). One of 
those apparently approached by Khaled grew 
suspicious of his Hizbi rivals and felt ‘side-
lined’ and then ‘betrayed’ when his arbakai 
commanders were killed (ibid). However, 
the Hizbi leaders who appear to have split 
with the Taliban and initiated the uprising 
were themselves soon marginalized. If it had 
been ‘started by a staunch, anti-government, 
anti-ISAF Hezbi group, fighting for ideo-
logical reasons’ within months the uprising 
‘turned into what looked and acted like an 
arbakai – an anti-Taleban militia which fights 
on the government’s behalf and is supplied 
and supported by ANSF and coalition forces’ 
(Habib 2012a). Khaled may have sought to 
capitalise on internal division within the 
Taliban, and then to assume control of the 
movement, progressively marginalizing 
rivals through alliances with more amenable 
local commanders.
The rivalry between local power-brokers 
who had emerged during the war years was 
proving to be as significant to local politics 
as were the ‘traditional’, ‘tribal’ sources of 
authority invoked in the ALP concept. Even if 
the uprising had begun in spontaneous and 
popular terms, within months local strug-
gles to instrumentalise it were resulting in 
fragmentation, with some villages apparently 
flying the flag of Hizb-i Islami, and others the 
government of Afghanistan. This had impor-
tant consequences. In addition to generating 
an escalation of local violence as a result of the 
Taliban backlash – within five months more 
than one hundred people had been killed 
(Habib 2012b) – there were reports of clashes 
between different arbakais and growing wari-
ness as they began to harass local people sus-
pected of Taliban sympathies. In the early 
months, people in Andar referred to the anti-
Taliban rebels as arbakai. As described above, 
international forces and ALP architects had 
attached positive connotations to this term, 
but within a year people in Andar were using 
the term ‘unanimously and perjoratively’ to 
‘denote a government or foreign-backed local 
force which fights, not for the protection of 
the local community, but because they are 
paid by outsiders and therefore act as irre-
sponsible mercenaries’ (Habib 2013a).
The Uprising exposed the difficulty faced 
by villagers wishing to reject the Taliban 
without aligning with the government. Once 
the Taliban determined to use force against 
the rebels, the latter had little choice but to 
accept or reach out to power-brokers capa-
ble of keeping their movement alive. Intra-
uprising divisions, both between ‘Hizbis’ 
and those affiliated to Khaled and within 
the latter group made the symbolic appeal 
of the uprising vulnerable to charges that 
it had been co-opted. As noted by Foschini 
(2012), while support of government-linked 
powerbrokers might enable the uprising to 
survive the Taliban backlash, this might not 
mean ‘better security and increased possi-
bilities for local kids to attend school – the 
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originally stated objective of the rising’. 
Moreover, the more the uprising was per-
ceived to be moving into a pro-government 
orbit, the more likely it would be to elicit 
concerted Taliban opposition. All in all, as 
one observer told The New York Times, the 
uprising had become ‘a bit of a mess’ (Rubin 
and Rosenberg 2012).
Enter the ALP: A ‘Helping Hand’ – but 
for whom? 
In late September 2012, barely six months 
into the uprising and in the midst of these 
complex local dynamics, US SOF arrived in 
Andar and soon began formal training for 
the ALP. The uprising they encountered did 
not simply reflect unified opposition to the 
Taliban, but a politically fragmented environ-
ment in which competition between local 
power-brokers seems to have been more 
decisive than the ‘traditions’ the programme 
was meant to tap. The Hizbi faction was mili-
tarily significant but hostile to the US, which 
may explain why international commentary 
emphasised the ‘popular’ character of the 
uprising, and why US SOF, wishing to margin-
alise Hizbi influence, distinguished between 
the ‘legitimate’ ALP that they trained, and 
the original defenders (Robinson 2013: 205). 
Adding to the complexities of a ‘popular’ 
movement already steered to some extent by 
Hizbi leaders as well as Khaled’s behind-the-
scenes activity, the US was now ‘essentially 
trying to set up a competing local defense 
force that was not under HIG [ie, Hizb-e 
Islami] influence’ (ibid). Where Hizbis were 
critical of the Taliban and of the govern-
ment, US SOF sought to draw the uprising 
into their orbit as a pro-government counter-
insurgency force. On paper the ALP merely 
offered a helping hand to villagers tired 
of insurgency and wanting to ‘stand up for 
themselves’ (Catanzaro and Windmueller 
2011). The way the ALP appears to have been 
established in Andar, however, exposes that 
the objectives of local uprisers, themselves 
not unified, were not synonymous with 
international objectives. A programme that 
claimed to simply reinforce spontaneous 
local resistance in practice sought to harness 
the uprising ‘repertoire’ to fulfil overarching 
counterinsurgency objectives to the extent 
that it built a parallel force that alienated 
existing uprisers. Those uprisers who did 
not view their rejection of the Taliban as an 
endorsement of the government were never-
theless forced, however reluctantly, to rely on 
outside help by military necessity. 
A further perception was that the ALP was 
not set up in the way envisaged on paper. An 
interviewee told us that rather than being 
appointed through local consultation in the 
way formally envisaged, he believed recruits 
were applying directly to district and pro-
vincial police officers, with positions filled 
by ‘young, unemployed people who have a 
background in petty crime’, and motivated 
by a salary. This perception echoes a range 
of other sources, who judged the ALP by its 
actions rather than its branding and were no 
less suspicious of this latest armed group. 
For example, Habib (2013a) reports a local 
teacher’s view that ‘[t]heir treatment of the 
people did not change. They are the same 
arbaki guys. They only changed their façade’. 
The community elder we interviewed was 
disappointed with the government for not 
supporting the uprising and instead setting 
up the ALP as an alternative ‘local’ force, 
which did not provide more security but was 
an additional source of insecurity, saying ‘we 
demanded the government to support the 
Uprising instead of sending drug-addicts 
and thugs pretending to police our com-
munities’. From the interviewee’s point of 
view, the way the ALP was set up reflected 
that ‘the government and provincial police 
authorities are more concerned with dem-
onstrating their presence’ but were ‘not con-
cerned about the demands and needs of the 
communities’. The case of Andar suggests 
that even where villagers showed a desire to 
‘take a stand’, international/state efforts to 
harness such movements were sometimes 
locally perceived not as a helping hand, but 
as an attempt to align these efforts with 
international/state security objectives with 
which they did not identify.
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However, Andar also illustrates how 
national and local actors were not passive 
in the face of this ‘bottom-up’ international 
counterinsurgency intervention, but sought 
to harness the ALP to agendas other than 
(and often at odds with) the international leit-
motifs of opposing and defeating the insur-
gency and extending state authority. While 
the ‘formal’ process of progressively incorpo-
rating the uprising into the ALP programme 
appeared quite successful, this did not sim-
ply replace pre-existing contestation over the 
uprising among Afghan stakeholders. Local 
ALP recruits continued to assert their inde-
pendence, one suggesting to journalists that 
they had agreed to join up because of ‘the 
shortage of weapons and supplies to con-
tinue the fight’ but were ‘not like the other 
ALP units’ (Habib 2013a). By accepting exter-
nal support, the uprisers risked their claim 
to local legitimacy by allowing the Taliban 
to portray them as being ‘in the foreigners’ 
embrace’ (Trofimov 2013). 
While the ALP on paper envisaged rein-
forcing an uprising such as that in Andar, 
in practice the ALP was building a new force 
that soon sought to expand into additional 
villages. Violence continued to escalate 
throughout 2013. By November the local 
conflict in Andar had claimed more than 
300 lives ‘exceeding all the dead of the 
conflict between summer 2003 and sum-
mer 2012’ as well as becoming qualitatively 
worse, with opponents even denying burial 
to fallen adversaries (Habib 2013b). Youths 
engaged to fight on both sides ‘do not feel 
bound by any outside authority or rule book 
and their way of fighting is entrenching 
hurt and anger’ (ibid). Following the wider 
post-2014 transition process, the support 
provided by local US SOF has been removed. 
Goldstein (2015) reports that the ALP in 
Andar has subsequently become more vul-
nerable and also less controlled, and reports 
accusations that ALP units in Andar engage 
in kidnappings, beatings, extortion and 
extrajudicial killing ‘partly to feed them-
selves and partly because there is no one to 
stop them’.
The Andar uprising was not as it was 
portrayed internationally – the heuristic 
of dynamics draws attention to disparate 
understandings, internal divisions, and how 
the uprising ‘narrative’ was itself contested 
by different actors, including international 
actors, vying to define it in their own pre-
ferred terms. The Andar ALP was not inserted 
into the ‘tribal’ world evoked by the imagery 
of village elders and shura decision-making, 
but a landscape in which the class of military 
entrepreneurs that emerged during decades 
of conflict were significant. A range of influ-
ential figures actively sought to manipulate 
the very attempts at negotiation and co-
option employed by international actors to 
advance their objectives at the local level. 
Around the country, wartime command-
ers were finding ways to have their militias 
enrolled in the ALP to obtain arms, salary and 
backing from US forces (Felbab-Brown 2012; 
see also Shirzay 2012). As a result, the ALP 
became a means through which a range of 
actors might obtain powerful external sup-
port and resources while claiming the legiti-
macy of tradition, or as was the case in Andar, 
of a popular movement. For all that the ALP 
invoked the power of the local on paper, in 
practice the attempt to harness local dynam-
ics to international COIN objectives proved 
problematic. The ALP did not simply align 
with and empower local anti-Taliban mobi-
lisation, nor did it reconfigure local dynam-
ics behind international counterinsurgency 
objectives. Instead, as international actors 
sought to advance their objectives through 
the programme, so too did local actors seek 
to harness the programme to their own 
agendas. 
Rather than evaluating the ambiguity 
of the Andar ALP in terms of the degree to 
which it appeared to advance or undermine 
stated counterinsurgency objectives, we sug-
gest its practices are better thought of as a 
contingent outcome of contestation dynam-
ics between multiple actors. Rather than 
aligning local actors with international COIN 
objectives, the ALP in practice expresses the 
disparate security interests of these actors 
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playing out under a nominally singular ban-
ner. Thus, the ALP’s behaviour in Andar is 
better understood as a ‘merged’ practice, its 
contribution to security or insecurity driven 
by ongoing contests between actors pursu-
ing quite different security ‘objectives’. In 
this sense the ALP ‘modality’ of intervention, 
precisely because it sought to work through 
the local, produced distinctive, apparently 
messy, security outcomes.
Conclusion
On paper the ALP expresses COIN doctrine, 
but in ‘going local’ it also shadows a wider 
shift in zeitgeist. The programme might first 
appear as a logical policy conclusion from 
some of the emerging analytic research on 
conflict-torn spaces, purportedly overcom-
ing the unsustainability of heavy footprint 
counterinsurgency by recognising and har-
nessing the latent power of Afghan culture 
and traditions to achieve ‘smarter’ forms of 
intervention. These attributes were com-
bined to create a programme that aligned 
international counterinsurgency objectives 
with an overwhelming local desire for secu-
rity, even during the drawdown and with-
drawal of international forces from combat 
roles. In light of the grave problems asso-
ciated with the programme, the ALP may 
then appear as a cautionary tale warning 
policymakers of the less palatable implica-
tions of ‘bottom-up’ interventions. Here, 
however, we suggest that a more careful 
examination of the move from analysis to 
intervention is needed. While highlighting 
that such policies do not simply overcome 
the problems of ‘top-down’ approaches, 
but also introduce tensions and ambigui-
ties of their own, we emphasise the ana-
lytic strength of the underlying heuristic 
approaches supposedly inspiring bottom-
up policies. Moreover, we have suggested 
such approaches enable useful insights into 
the dynamics of local settings and exter-
nal interventions, and help to anticipate 
why the ALP, for all its emphasis on locally 
appropriate forms of intervention, has still 
proven so messy in practice.
Taken at face value, the literature rethink-
ing the political order of conflict-torn spaces 
closely parallels particular claims underpin-
ning the programme. In particular, inter-
preting Afghan history as a tale about the 
inappropriateness of seeking to project state 
authority into a rural periphery governed 
by ‘traditional’ authority structures is used 
to depict existing international policy as 
misguided and justify the turn to ‘go local’. 
This argument echoes broader critiques of 
state fragility discourse and neo-Weberian 
state-building policy that constitute a point 
of departure for the literature rethinking 
the political order of conflict-torn spaces. 
Arbakai and similar pre-existing security 
institutions are then presented as the key to 
past success in rural security provision: the 
government having worked with the grain 
of existing non-state security institutions 
rather than provoking conflict by seeking 
to override such institutions. This reason-
ing, again, closely parallels debates in the 
literature rethinking the political order of 
conflict-torn spaces regarding the need to 
better understand and engage with existing 
local institutions.
The widely observed difficulties with the 
programme at first suggest that the policy 
turn to ‘bottom-up’ may not simply correct 
mainstream approaches but also introduce 
new complications. Here we insisted on 
distinguishing policy advocacy from more 
analytically-driven work since the latter, 
far from simply justifying the bottom-up 
policy turn, actually helps to anticipate 
some of the difficulties. To demonstrate 
this analytic strength, we adopted a more 
dynamic understanding of political order as 
an heuristic analytical lens. In the absence 
of a monopoly of force, the political order of 
Afghanistan can be thought of as an arena 
of competition and negotiation of various 
authorities with different security objec-
tives, degrees of influence and relationships 
that vary spatially and change temporally. 
Depending on the specific dynamics of each 
locality, the competition over the owner-
ship of the ALP resulted in a context-specific 
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merged practice. Hence, even though the 
ALP on paper is described as being embed-
ded in the counterinsurgency ‘security cul-
ture’, its implementation in the context of 
the outlined dynamics make it look very dif-
ferently in practice. The changing zeitgeist 
regarding the political order of conflict-
torn spaces and the evolving literature on 
dynamic statehood is analytically valuable 
but should not be mistaken for a new policy 
blueprint guaranteeing legitimacy and effi-
ciency in attempts to transform political 
order. 
In the case of Andar, the ALP’s contribu-
tion to international counterinsurgency 
objectives and to community level security 
was highly ambiguous. We have illustrated 
that this ‘messiness’ in practice can be better 
understood by using the literature rethink-
ing the political order of conflict-torn spaces 
as an analytical framework – and not as a new 
basis for designing international interven-
tions such as the ALP. Just as ‘neo-Weberian’ 
approaches are widely perceived to have sub-
stituted a normative-teleological idea of the 
state for Weber’s ideal-typical analytic tool, 
the ALP programme can be interpreted as 
demonstrating the dangers in moving from 
concepts such as hybridity for analytic pur-
poses to employing them as the grounds 
for new modalities of intervention. Using 
this heuristic it becomes clear that although 
the ALP claims to take seriously the power 
of local agency, this claim is undermined 
by the assumption that that power can be 
harnessed and aligned with international 
objectives. The way the programme plays out 
reflects the outcome – to some extent unin-
tended by any single actor – of processes of 
contestation between multiple actors – local, 
national and international – all vying for 
‘ownership’. 
This is not the end of the story. Despite hav-
ing been inspired by US COIN efforts and still 
being sustained by US funding, the security 
transition process has meant that ALP units 
receive less direct mentorship than during 
the surge period. Consequently, the ALP is 
both less supported and less controlled and 
has, to some extent, taken on a momentum of 
its own as it becomes enmeshed in and rein-
forces local conflict dynamics. The ALP never 
became the animal that its creators depicted 
‘on paper’, but its practices continue to be 
at least as much propelled by local dynam-
ics as they have been successful in harness-
ing them. Meanwhile, the ALP appears to 
have a community of supporters who see it 
as a model with applicability to a range of 
conflict-torn spaces. Here we reiterate that 
emerging analytic work on the importance 
of dynamics in such spaces, often seen as 
the basis for ‘going local’, actually provides 
a valuable lens for anticipating some of the 
supposedly unintended consequences likely 
arising from the jump to ALP-like policies in 
other contexts.
Competing Interests
The authors declare that they have no com-
peting interests.
Acknowledgments
Our sincere thanks go to Mary Kaldor, Sabine 
Selchow, Anouk Rigterink, Ali Ali, Sally 
Stares, David Brenner, Theowen Gilmour, 
Louis-Alexandre Berg and two anonymous 
reviewers for their invaluable comments 
and suggestions. We also want to express 
thanks to the participants at the work-
shop on the ‘Unintended Consequences 
of Statebuilding Interventions’ at 
Queen Mary University of London in 
March 2014 and at the International 
Studies Association’s (ISA) 56th Annual 
Convention in New Orleans, Louisiana in 
February 2015. Florian Weigand gratefully 
acknowledges the support of the Economic 
and Social Research Council (ESRC) (grant 
number ES/J500070/1). We are also 
grateful for the support of the Security 
in Transition Research Programme, 
funded by the European Research Council 
(ERC) (grant reference 269441) at LSE’s 
Civil Society and Human Security 
Research Unit, and for the opportunity to 
contribute to the special issue on the secu-
rity gap.
Vincent et al: The Afghan Local Police – Closing the Security Gap?Art. 45, page 18 of 26
Notes
 1 Referring to the wider Village Stability 
Operations concept with which the ALP 
programme is associated (Huslander and 
Spivey 2012; L’Etoile 2011; Robinson 
2013).
 2 The term ‘neo-Weberian’ has also been 
used by Lemay-Hébert (2013) to con-
vey the need to distinguish Weber’s 
ideas from those of later scholars who 
invoke Weber but simplify or modify 
his ideas.
 3 Goodhand and Hakimi (2014), Hakimi 
(2013) and Hakimi (2014) point to this 
parallel but develop their arguments in 
relation to the colonial parallels of the 
ALP (see also Belcher 2015; Martin 2009). 
We do not, however, suggest that the pro-
gramme drew direct inspiration from the 
work of Boege et al or Menkhaus. In light 
of self-conscious efforts to make social 
science serve US military objectives in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly associ-
ated with McFate, it seems possible ideas 
from this body of literature may have 
been assimilated during the development 
of the ALP. Our argument is that focus-
ing solely on the ALP neglects its clear 
resonance in broader trends depicted 
above. The programme also has other 
lineages, both in the SOF/CIA oust-
ing of the Taliban (Shankur 2013) and 
subsequent militia experiments (Clark 
2013; Mazetti and Filikins 2010), and in 
earlier programmes such as the Afghan 
National Auxiliary Police (ANAP), Afghan 
Social Outreach Program, Community 
Defense Forces, Community Defense 
Initiative (CDI) (which was replaced by 
Local Defense Initiative (LDI)), Interim 
Security for Critical Infrastructure units, 
and Afghan Public Protection Force 
Program (AP3) (Goodhand and Hakimi 
2014: 10–13; Jones 2012; Lefèvre 2010; 
Perito 2009; Saum-Manning 2012). Both 
the National Directorate of Security and 
the Ministry of Interior have also estab-
lished local self-defence units (Felbab-
Brown 2012). The ALP is also widely seen 
as a descendant of similar initiatives 
during the Vietnam War (Brown 2013; 
Strandquist 2013).
 4 It is also necessary to note that Jones’ por-
trait of the ‘successes’ of the Musahiban 
period working through local institutions 
(which draws on Barfield 2010: 195–225) 
is a rosier portrait than other scholars 
might allow.
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